{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents","authors":[{"name":"Yoram Bachrach","slug":"yoram-bachrach","given":"Yoram","family":"Bachrach","affiliation":""},{"name":"Jeffrey S. Rosenschein","slug":"jeffrey-s-rosenschein","given":"Jeffrey S.","family":"Rosenschein","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are a framework for finding a solution to a distributed optimization problem in systems of self-interested agents. VCG mechanisms have received wide attention in the AI community because they are efficient and strategy-proof; a special case of the Groves family of mechanisms, VCG mechanisms are the only direct-revelation mechanisms that are allocatively efficient and strategy-proof. Unfortunately, they are only weakly budget-balanced. We consider self-interested agents in a network flow domain, and show that in this domain, it is possible to design a mechanism that is both allocatively-efficient and almost completely budget-balanced. This is done by choosing a mechanism that is not strategy-proof but rather strategyresistant. Instead of using the VCG mechanism, we propose a mechanism in which finding a beneficial manipulation is an NP-complete problem, and the payments from the agents to the mechanism may be minimized as much as desired.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/265","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/0265.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/265.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/bibtex/265","volume":{"slug":"2005","title":"Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2005","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/","year":2005,"location":"Edinburgh, Scotland, UK","dates":"","editors":"","isbn":"","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":null,"track":"","number":265,"pages":{"first":1653,"last":1653},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}