{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives","authors":[{"name":"Sébastien Lahaie","slug":"sebastien-lahaie","given":"Sébastien","family":"Lahaie","affiliation":""},{"name":"Florin Constantin","slug":"florin-constantin","given":"Florin","family":"Constantin","affiliation":""},{"name":"David C. Parkes","slug":"david-c-parkes","given":"David C.","family":"Parkes","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"Query learning models from computational learning theory (CLT) can be adopted to perform elicitation in combinatorial auctions. Indeed, a recent elicitation framework demonstrated that the equivalence queries of CLT can be usefully simulated with price-based demand queries. In this paper, we validate the flexibility of this framework by defining a learning algorithm for atomic bidding languages, a class that includes XOR and OR. We also handle incentives, characterizing the communication requirements of the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves outcome rule. This motivates an extension to the earlier learning framework that brings truthful responses to queries into an equilibrium.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/191","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/0191.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/191.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/bibtex/191","volume":{"slug":"2005","title":"Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2005","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/","year":2005,"location":"Edinburgh, Scotland, UK","dates":"","editors":"","isbn":"","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":null,"track":"","number":191,"pages":{"first":959,"last":963},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}