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Prolegomenon to a Theory of Conservative Belief Revision

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Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1391-1392.

Abstract

A standard intuition underlying traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change. In this paper we introduce a novel account of belief change in which the agent's belief state is modified minimally to incorporate exactly the new information. Thus a revision by p V q will result in a new belief state in which p V q is believed, but a stronger proposition (such asp A q) is not, regardless of the initial form of the belief state.

James P. Delgrande, Abhaya C. Nayak, and Maurice Pagnucco. 2003. Prolegomenon to a Theory of Conservative Belief Revision. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-03. IJCAI, 1391–1392. https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2003/210
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