---
title: "Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids"
authors:
  - "Makoto Yokoo"
  - "Yuko Sakurai"
  - "Shigeo Matsubara"
doi: ""
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2001/145"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2001/0145.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2001
pages: "1095-1100"
track: ""
keywords:
---

# Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara

*Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 1095-1100.

## Abstract

This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying AI technologies. However, the possibility of a new type of cheating called a false-name bid, i.e., a bid submitted under a fictitious name, has been pointed out. A protocol called Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol that is robust against false-name bids has been developed. However, this protocol requires the auctioneer to define a leveled division set. A leveled division set is a series of division sets, where a division set is a set of divisions and a division is a combination of bundles of goods. We need to solve a very complicated optimization problem to construct a leveled division set in order to obtain a good social surplus. We have developed a heuristic method for overcoming this problem. In this method, we first find a good division with a winner determination algorithm, and then construct a leveled division set by using this division as a seed. Through a simulation, we show that our method can obtain a social surplus that is very close to optimal.