Cancelling and Overshadowing: Two Types of Defeasibility in Defeasible Deontic Logic
Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Non-monotonic Reasoning. Pages 1525-1532.
Abstract
In this paper we give a general analysis of dyadic deontic logics that were introduced in the early seventies to formalize deontic reasoning about subideal behavior. Recently it was observed that they are closely related to nonmonotonic logics, theories of diagnosis and decision theories . In particular, we argue that two types of defeasibility must be distinguished in a defeasible deontic logi c: overridden defeasibility that formalizes cancelling of an ob li gation by other conditional obligations and factual defeasibility that formalizes overshadowing of an obligation by a violating fact. We also show that this distinction is essential for an adequate ana lysis of notorious 'paradoxes' of deontic logic such as the Chisholm and Forrester 'Paradoxes'.
@inproceedings{ijcai1995p197,
title = {Cancelling and Overshadowing: Two Types of Defeasibility in Defeasible Deontic Logic},
author = {van der Torre, Leendert W. N. and Tan, Yao-Hua},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-95}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Chris S. Mellish},
pages = {1525--1532},
year = {1995},
note = {Non-monotonic Reasoning},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1995/197},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Cancelling and Overshadowing: Two Types of Defeasibility in Defeasible Deontic Logic AU - van der Torre, Leendert W. N. AU - Tan, Yao-Hua T2 - Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-95 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1995 SP - 1525 EP - 1532 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1995/197 ER -Copied
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