Commonsense Entailment: A Modal Theory of Non-monotonic Reasoning
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Knowledge Representation. Pages 387-391.
Abstract
In this paper, we construct a truth conditional semantics for generic sentences, which treats arbitrarily deep nestings of generic sentences. The resulting notion of logical entailment captures intuitively valid argument forms involving generics. A dynamic semantics is built on top of the truth conditional one, and the resulting inference notion captures nonmonotonic argument patterns familiar from the artificial intelligence literature by exploiting constraints on modal frames alone, without the use of ordering principles on rules, abnormality or "relevance" predicates.
@inproceedings{ijcai1991p58,
title = {Commonsense Entailment: A Modal Theory of Non-monotonic Reasoning},
author = {Asher, Nicholas and Morreau, Michael},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-91}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {John Mylopoulos and Ray Reiter},
pages = {387--391},
year = {1991},
month = {8},
note = {Knowledge Representation},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1991/58},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Commonsense Entailment: A Modal Theory of Non-monotonic Reasoning AU - Asher, Nicholas AU - Morreau, Michael T2 - Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-91 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1991 SP - 387 EP - 391 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1991/58 ER -Copied
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