On the Semantics of Counterfactuals
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Knowledge Representation. Pages 1382-1386.
Abstract
It is argued that Ginsberg's Possible Worlds Approach to counterfactual implication suffers from a number of defects which are the result of confusing proof theory and model theory. In particular, logically equivalent theories do not have identical counterfactual consequences, and monotonic theory revisions are not always preferred to nonmonotonic ones. This paper develops a situation semantics for counterfactual implication in which propositions are treated as operations on sets of possible worlds. Logically equivalent theories have identical consequences in the model theory, which always prefers monotonic revisions to nonmonotonic ones and validates all the axioms and derivation rules of counterfactual logic. The semantics is also contrasted with Winslett's Possible Models Approach.
@inproceedings{ijcai1989p221,
title = {On the Semantics of Counterfactuals},
author = {Jackson, Peter},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-89}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {N. S. Sridharan},
pages = {1382--1386},
year = {1989},
month = {8},
note = {Knowledge Representation},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1989/221},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - On the Semantics of Counterfactuals AU - Jackson, Peter T2 - Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-89 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1989 SP - 1382 EP - 1386 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1989/221 ER -Copied
Machine-readable versions of this paper, for tools and AI agents:
