In Defense of Probability

Abstract

In this paper, it is argued that probability theory, when used correctly, is sufficient for the task of reasoning under uncertainty. Since numerous authors have rejected probability as inadequate for various reasons, the bulk of the paper is aimed at refuting these claims and indicating the scources of error. In particular, the definition of probability as a measure of belief rather than a frequency ratio is advocated, since a frequency interpretation of probability drastically restricts the domain of applicability. Other sources of error include the confusion between relative and absolute probability, the distinction between probability and . the uncertainty of that probability. Also, the interaction of logic and probability is discusses and it is argued that many extensions of logic, such as "default logic" are better understood in a probabilistic framework . The main claim of this paper is that the numerous schemes for representing and reasoning about uncertainty that have appeared in the Al Iiterature are unnecessary-probability is all that is needed.