A Deductive Model of Belief
Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Knowledge Representation. Pages 377-380.
Abstract
Representing and reasoning about the knowledge an agent (human or computer) must have to accomplish some task is becoming an increasingly important issue in artificial intelligence (AI) research. To reason about an agent's beliefs, an AI system must assume some formal model of those beliefs. An attractive candidate is the Deductive Belief model: an agent's beliefs are described as a set of sentences in some formal language (the base sentences), together with a deductive process for deriving consequences of those beliefs. In particular, a Deductive Belief model can account for the effect of resource limitations on deriving consequences of the base set: an agent need not believe all the logical consequences of his beliefs. In this paper we develop a belief model based on the notion of deduction , and contrast it with current AI formalisms for belief derived from Hintikka/Kripke possible-worlds semantics for knowledge.
@inproceedings{ijcai1983p90,
title = {A Deductive Model of Belief},
author = {Konolige, Kurt},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-83}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Alan Bundy},
pages = {377--380},
year = {1983},
note = {Knowledge Representation},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1983/90},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Deductive Model of Belief AU - Konolige, Kurt T2 - Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-83 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1983 SP - 377 EP - 380 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1983/90 ER -Copied
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