Computational Aspects of the Preference Cores of Supermodular Two-Scenario Cooperative Games

Computational Aspects of the Preference Cores of Supermodular Two-Scenario Cooperative Games

Daisuke Hatano, Yuichi Yoshida

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main track. Pages 310-316. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/43

In a cooperative game, the utility of a coalition of players is given by the characteristic function, and the goal is to find a stable value division of the total utility to the players. In real-world applications, however, multiple scenarios could exist, each of which determines a characteristic function, and which scenario is more important is unknown. To handle such situations, the notion of multi-scenario cooperative games and several solution concepts have been proposed. However, computing the value divisions in those solution concepts is intractable in general. To resolve this issue, we focus on supermodular two-scenario cooperative games in which the number of scenarios is two and the characteristic functions are supermodular and study the computational aspects of a major solution concept called the preference core. First, we show that we can compute the value division in the preference core of a supermodular two-scenario game in polynomial time. Then, we reveal the relations among preference cores with different parameters. Finally, we provide more efficient algorithms for deciding the non-emptiness of the preference core for several specific supermodular two-scenario cooperative games such as the airport game, multicast tree game, and a special case of the generalized induced subgraph game.
Keywords:
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory