A Crowdfunding Model for Green Energy Investment / 2669
Ronghuo Zheng, Ying Xu, Nilanjan Chakraborty, Katia Sycara
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This paper studies a new renewable energy investment model through crowdfunding, which is motivated by emerging community solar farms. In this paper we develop a sequential game theory model to capture the interactions among crowdfunders, the solar farm owner, and an electricity company who purchases renewable energy generated by the solar farm in a multi-period framework. By characterizing a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, andcomparing it with a benchmark model without crowdfunding, we find that under crowdfunding although the farm owner reduces its investment level, the overall green energy investment level is increased due to the contribution of crowdfunders. We also find that crowdfunding can increase the penetration of green energy in consumption and thus reduce the energy procurement cost of the electricity company. Finally, the numerical results based on real data indicates crowdfunding is a simple but effective way to boost green generation.